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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally the doctor - patient relationship has been paternalistic in nature, the 
physicians knowledge placed him or her in a powerful position with respect to the 
patient. As the public have become better educated and more knowledgeable, 
patients are exerting their rights to autonomy and self-determination. To redress the 
power imbalance and to enable patients to make informed choices about their 
treatment it is essential that patients receive information about the benefits and 
risks associated with any course of treatment. 
This paper examines the scope and content of a doctor's duty to advise and inform 
patients of the risks and implications of proposed treatment in New Zealand. It then 
compares the New Zealand law to the jmisdictions of Australia, Canada and 
England in relation to the disclosure of the risks associated with third generation 
oral contraceptive pills. 
2. NEW ZEALAND LEGAL POSITION ON DISCLOSURE OF RISKS IN 
MEDICAL PROCEDURES 
A. The Position in New Zealand Prior to the Accident Compensation Act 
1972 
Prior to the accident compensation legislation Smith v Auckland Area Health 
Board1 was the leading decision on disclosure of risks in medical treatment in New 
Zealand. In that case the plaintiff suffered from a suspected aortic anneurysm. A 
diagnostic procedure known as an aortagram was canied out. This involved the 
injection of an opaque dye into his aortic artery to allow examination by means of 
an x-ray. During the procedure the flow of blood to his leg was interrupted 
necessitating the amputation of the leg. Prior to the aortagram the plaintiff had 
inquired if there were any risks involved. The doctor glossed over the question and 
reassured the plaintiff that he would be fine in a few days, neglecting to warn of the 
slight risks involved. 
1 [1965] NZLR 191. 
2 
The plaintiff brought an action m negligence against the doctor's employer in 
respect of the conduct of the aortagram procedure and for the failure to warn the 
plaintiff of the risk of mishap. Despite the jury's finding that the hospital was 
negligent in respect of its failure , by its employees, to inform the plaintiff 
adequately of the 1isks Woodhouse J gave judgment for the hospital. The Court of 
Appeal reversed the decision and upheld the jury's verdict imposing a duty of care 
on the doctor in answering the patient's questions as the patient was relying on the 
answer as the basis of his consent to the procedure. The Court of Appeal restricted 
their decision to cases where an express inquiry as to the risks involved is made. 2 
So where a patient makes a request for information the doctor is obliged to give an 
honest answer. 
B. Disclosure of Risks in Medical Treatment under Accident Compensation 
Legislation 
Negligence for failure to disclose risks in medical treatment is now the subject of 
the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 as section 14 
excludes actions for damages arising directly or indirectly out of personal injury 
covered by the Act. The accident compensation scheme does not however bar civil 
action where there is no physical injury or actions for exemplary damages. 3 
Early decisions of the Accident Compensation Appeal Authorit/ on claims for 
medical misadventure restricted the decision in Smith v Auckland Area Health 
Boarct':; holding that unless a patient asked specific questions the doctor was not 
obliged to inform the patient of risks involved in the treatment.6 
The Accident Compensation Appeal Authority has since recognised an obligation 
on doctors to adequately advise and inform patients of risks. Inaccurate advice, 
2 Smith v Auckland Area Health Board, above nl , 197. 
3 See Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] l NZLR 97; Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR 564. 
4 See Re Priestley ACAA 14/84; Re McElhinney ACAA 177/88; Re P ACAA 2/89 ; Goslingv v ACC 
[1990] NZAR 76. 
5 Smith v Auckland Area Health Board, above nl. 
6 David B Collins Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992) 59-60. 
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whether in response to a question or not, was held to be medical misadventure in 
ReK7. 
In H v ACc8 a woman became pregnant after her doctor failed to warn her of the 
risk that her tuba] ligation might fail to sterilise her. This was held not to be 
medical misadventure as the failure to warn of the risk did not cause the pregnancy. 
However the advice that she could discontinue other contraception was held to be 
an inadequate answer to her question and therefore constituted medical 
misadventure. 
In the case of Smith v ACC9 it was held that to establish medical misadventure for 
lack of informed consent the plaintiff must show that the doctor owed a duty of 
care to inform the plaintiff of the risk, that the doctor breached that duty and that 
the damage suffered was caused by the breach of the duty. 
C. Medical Council of New Zealand's Position on Disclosure of 
Information 
In 1990 the Medical Council of New Zealand resolved to publish a statement on 
information and consent to offer guidelines to the medical profession. The Medical 
Council believes that any statutory definition of medical misconduct should include 
the inadequate transfer of information to a patient deciding on a medical procedure. 
The Medical Council of New Zealand takes the view that (except in an 
emergency or a related circumstance) the proper sharing of information, and the 
offering of suitable advice to patients, is a mandatory prerequisite to any medical 
procedure instituted by a medical practitioner. This applies whether the 
procedure is a diagnostic one, a medical or pharmacological regimen, an 
anaesthetic, or any surgical, obstetric, or operative procedure. 
10 
Information must be conveyed to the patient in such detail and in such a manner, 
using appropriate language, as to ensure that an informed decision can be made 
7 [1986] 6 NZAR 231. 
8 [1990] 8 NZAR 289. 
9 [1993] NZAR 490. 
10 Medical Council of New Zealand "A Statement for the Medical Profession on Information and 
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by that particular patient. The necessary standard for this requirement ( that is 
the extent, specificity and mode of offering the information should be that which 
would reflect the existing knowledge of the actual patient and the practitioner. 
More generally, it should also reflect what a prudent patient in similar 
. . h II c1rcumstances nug t expect. 
Thus the Medical Council of New Zealand appears to be in favour of a patient 
focused standard rather than the doctor focused standard12 developed by the House 
of Lords in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Beth/em Royal Hospita/ 13 
D. Accident Rehabilitation, Compensation and Insurance Act 1992 
Personal injury that is the result of a negligent failure to obtain informed consent is 
covered by the accident compensation legislation. 
Section 8 (2) Cover under this Act shall extend to personal injury which-
(c) Is medical misadventure ... 
Section 5 Definition of "medical misadventure" 
(b) A failure to obtain informed consent to treatment from the person on whom 
the treatment is performed or that person ' s parents, legal guardian, or welfare 
guardian, as the case may be, is medical misadventure only if the registered 
health professional acted negligently in failing to obtain informed consent. 
In the 1997 High Court case of Doyle v Accident Compensation Corporation14 the 
facts had not been sufficiently established in the Accident Compensation Appeal 
Authority so Fisher J answered the question of law on assumed facts so as not to 
further delay the proceedings. The case was destined to fail as the personal injury 
did not occur in New Zealand, however Fisher J held medical misadventure 
Consent" (Wellington, 1990). 
11 Medical Council of New Zealand "A Statement for the Medical Profession on Information and 
Consent" ( 1990). 
12 David B Collins Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992) 59-60. 
13 [1985] l All ER 643 . 
14[1997] 3 NZLR 160. 
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includes a mishap flowing from deficient medical advice 15 which can take one of 
two forms: 
• "[a] breach of a doctor's duty to use due care in answering a patient's 
question where the patient, to the knowledge of the doctor, intends to rely 
on the answer in making a decision with respect to a potential medical 
procedure" 
• a breach of doctor's "duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in 
proposed treatment. A risk is material: 
(i) if in the circumstances a reasonable person in the patient's position, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it; or 
(ii) if the medical practitioner is aware, or reasonably should be aware, 
that if warned of the risk, the particular patient would be likely to attach 
significance to it"16 
To summarise, in a case of the present kind the claimant must prove three things: 
(a) deficient medical advice, in the sense that the information provided culpably 
misrepresented the likely outcome or culpably failed to warn of material risks as 
to the likely outcome; 
(b) physical or mental consequences which were adverse and unforeseen from 
the claimant' s point of view; and 
(c) a causal link between the two. 17 
This case illustrates a shift from the English standards of professional negligence 
favoured in the earlier Accident Compensation Appeal Authority cases towards the 
Australian and North American patient focused standards. 
E. Health and Disability Commissioner's Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumers' Rights 1996 
Right six of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers ' Rights 
provides the right to be reasonably informed. 
15 Doyle v ACC, above nl4, 165. 
16 Doyle v ACC, above nl4, 165. 
17 Doyle v ACC, above nl4, 166. 
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(1) Every consumer has the right to the information that a reasonable 
consumer, in that consumer's circumstances, would expect to receive, 
including 
(b) An explanation of the options available, including an assessment of 
the risks ... 
A complaint that any action of any health care provider or disability services 
provider appears to be in breach of the Code may be made under section 31 of the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. The Commissioner can investigate 
the complaint, refer the complaint to an advocate for resolution or decline to take 
any action. 
If the complaint is investigated and found to be in breach of the Code section 45 
provides that the Commissioner may refer the matter to the Director of Proceedings 
who may assist the complainant to take proceedings, institute proceedings before 
the Complaints Review Tribunal or institute disciplinary proceedings. The 
Complaints Review Tribunal has a discretion as to remedies but can grant 
declarations, damages and orders as to conduct. 
Section 57 provides that the Tribunal may award damages for 
(a) pecuniary loss 
(b) loss of any benefit 
(c) humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the aggrieved person 
(d) any action of the defendant that was in flagrant disregard of the rights of the 
aggrieved person. 
F. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
In Simpson v Attorney-General18 the Court of Appeal held that a breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act can give rise to a discretionary remedy by way of 
monetary compensation. The accident compensation scheme bar applies only to 
proceedings for damages arising out of personal injury covered by the scheme. 
Thus the bar may not apply to Bill of Rights actions even where there is personal 
18 [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
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injury. The scope of this remedy in medical negligence cases is likely to be narrow 
as courts will probably take into account the availability of other courses of action 
and, if accident compensation is available, the court would be unlikely to find it 
inadequate. 19 
Section 11 provides the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment, inherent in 
which is the right to be informed of the risks involved in medical treatment so as to 
be able to make an informed choice whether to undergo or forego the treatment. 
Theoretically an action could be brought for a breach of the Bill of Rights Act but 
the outcome of such an action is uncertain especially if there is a personal injury 
involved. 
G. Exemplary Damages 
Exemplary damages" ... sometimes also called punitive damages are not awarded 
to compensate the plaintiff (although of course they will be some solace) but to 
punish the defendant for high-handed disregard of the plaintiff's rights or the like 
outrageous conduct. "20 
Claims for exemplary damages are not barred by the accident compensation 
legislation.21 However exemplary damages should only be awarded where the 
compensatory damages are insufficient to punish the defendant and any temptation 
to award exemplary damages merely because the statutory benefits may be felt to 
be inadequate should be kept under a tight rein. 22 
19 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 94. 
20 Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR 564, 57 l. 
21 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] l NZLR 97 . 
22 Donselaar, above n21, 104, 107. 
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3. CASE STUDY: DISCLOSURE OF THE RISKS OF THIRD GENERATION 
ORAL CONTRACEPTIVE PILLS 
A. Background Information 
The oral contraceptive pill consists of two hormones - oestrogen and progesterone. 
It prevents pregnancy by ceasing ovulation, the production of eggs. The third 
generation of oral contraceptive pills use desogestrel or gestodene as the 
progesterone. These two progesterones have an increased risk of venous 
thromboembolism (vTE)23. VTE is a condition whereby a blood clot forms in a large 
vein. When pieces of the clot break off and travel to the lungs, it is known as a 
pulmonary embolus, which can be life threatening.24 
A series of studies in 199525 revealed that the risk of developing a blood clot was 
double for women on the third generation pills in comparison to the second 
generation pills. Instead of one in ten thousand with the older pills the chances are 
two in ten thousand. In October 1995 British women were advised to change 
contraceptive pill brands. The result was a 'pill scare' - a rise in unwanted 
pregnancies and abortions. 26 
In New Zealand the Ministry of Health formulates advice on prescribing drugs for 
doctors. In July 1996 the Ministry of Health advised medical practitioners to 
consider prescribing one of the oral contraceptives containing levonorgestrel or 
norethisterone in preference to one of the third generation pills.27 
By May 1999 nine New Zealand women had died from blood clots while using a 
23 Ministry of Health "Prescriber Update" 12 (1996) 2. 
24 Medsafe "Oral Contraceptives and Blood Clots" (Medsafe, Wellington, Feb 1999) 
25 WHO "Collaborative Study of Cardiovascular Diseaese and Steriod Hormone Contraception. 
Veneous thromboembolism and combined oral contraceotives: results of international multicentre 
case-control study" Lancet (1995) 346: 1575. WHO "Collaborative Study of Cardiovascular 
Diseaese and Steriod Hormone Contraception. Effect of different progestagens in low oestrogen oral 
contraceptives on veneous thromboembolic disease" Lancet (1995) 346: 1582. 
26 W O Spitzer "The 1995 Pill Scare Revisited: Anatomy of a Non-epidemic" 12 (1997) Human 
Reproduction, 2347-57. 
27 Ministry of Health "Prescriber Update" 12 July (1996) 2. 
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third generation oral contraceptive pill.28 
B. Legal Action for Deficient Medical Advice in New Zealand 
If a patient has been prescribed third generation oral contraceptive pills without 
adequate disclosure of the risks involved there are several avenues of legal 
recourse. 
1. Accident Rehabilitation, Compensation and Insurance Act 1992 
A patient will be eligible for compensation under the accident compensation 
scheme if she can establish medical misadventure, to do so requires negligence on 
behalf of the doctor. A doctor has a duty of care to warn a patient of material 1isks 
in proposed treatment.29 Thus materiality of the risk must be established to found a 
duty of care. 
"The risk of a normal healthy woman developing a blood clot in one year is one in 
30,000."30 Second generation pills have a one in 10,000 risk while third generation 
pills have a two in 10,000 risk and pregnancy has a six in 10,000 risk. 
Of those who get a blood clot, 1-2 percent will die. One death in about two 
years would be expected in New Zealand woman using oral contraceptives. 
Up to the end of 1998, at least seven woman using oral contraceptives died in 
New Zealand of a blood clot on the lungs .... All of those who died were using 
third generation pills, the first of which became available in 1982. The reason 
for the higher than expected number of deaths in recent years is unclear. 
Sometimes natural fluctuations can cause unexpectedly high or low numbers 
of events.31 
The risk is therefore quite small but if it eventuates the consequences are very 
severe. A perfectly healthy woman may not attach any significance to the risk, 
28 Ministry of Health Press Release 25 May 1999; M Johnston "The Pill: clots kill more women" 
The New Zealand Herald 26 May 1999, l. 
29 Doyle v ACC, above nl4, 165. 
30 Medsafe :Oral Contraceptives and Blood Clots" (Medsafe, Wellington, Feb 1999). 
See also www.medsafe.govt.nz 
31 Above n30. 
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however the patient's position may be such that a reasonable person in that position 
would attach significance to it. 
Some of the risk factors for blood clots are a previous blood clot, a 
close family member who has had a blood clot, bad varicose veins, 
being overweight, cancer, recent surgery and being immobilised. 
Woman who have had a previous blood clot should not take a 
contraceptive pill containing oestrogen.32 
If a patient has increased risk factors then a duty to warn of inherent risks exists. 
Also if a patient asks about the risks involved the doctor is obliged to answer 
accurately.33 If the patient does not have any of the increased risk factors and does 
not ask about the risks involved the doctor may not owe her any duty to disclose 
the risk. The defendant would argue that as the risk is higher whilst pregnant and 
the pill prevents pregnancy then the slight risk is in fact protecting the patient from 
an even higher risk. However as there are other courses of action available to the 
patient, in order to make an informed choice, she requires all relevant information , 
so a duty of care may exist. 
To receive compensation under the accident compensation scheme it is necessary 
to have a personal injury - adverse or unforeseen physical or mental consequences 
from the plaintiff's point of view.34 If the plaintiff actually suffers from VTE 
proving damage will be straight forward. If the plaintiff suffers no actual personal 
injury then despite the deficient medical advice she cannot recover under the 
accident compensation scheme. 
There must be a causal link between the deficient advice and the adverse 
consequence. This appears to mean that the plaintiff must show that had she 
received the correct medical advice she would have followed an alternate course of 
action. In this case that the plaintiff would not have taken the third generation 
contraceptive pill. This could be difficult to establish as of course with hindsight 
she would not have taken the pill, so it will be an evidential matter. 
32 Medsafe "Oral Contraceptives and Blood Clots" (Medsafe, Wellington, 1999). 
33 Smith v Auckland Area Health Board, :ibove nl. 
34 Doyle v ACC, above nl4. 
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Causation is factually difficult to prove in medical negligence cases due to the 
complex nature of disease and injury. It is necessary to show that the doctor's 
conduct could cause the plaintiff harm and that in the particular case the harm did 
arise from the doctor's conduct. 35 The former depends on expert opinion which can 
vary widely, whilst the latter requires establishing exactly what the doctor's 
conduct was. 
The House of Lords examined causation in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health 
Authority36 In that case the plaintiff fell from a tree injuring his hip. The injury was 
not correctly diagnosed till five days after the accident, by which time the plaintiff 
had developed a condition which caused major permanent disability. If the plaintiff 
had been correctly diagnosed there was still a 75 percent chance of developing the 
disability, so the trial judge awarded damages for the loss of the 25 percent chance 
of recovery. Though the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, the House 
of Lords reversed it on the basis that the fall was the sole cause of the plaintiff' s 
injury so negligence could not be established. 
In the case of Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority37 the House of Lords 
emphasised that the burden of proving causation rests on the plaintiff and that apart 
from exceptional cases the plaintiff must show the defendant caused or materially 
contributed to the injury. Materially increasing the risk of injury does not establish 
a material contribution but may form the basis of an inference that the defendant 
did materially contribute to the injury. 
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority38 concerned a two year old boy with 
respiratory difficulties. When his condition deteriorated the senior paediatric 
registrar was called, who left a message for her senior house officer to attend. Due 
to a faulty bleeper the message did not get through and the child suffered a total 
respiratory collapse and cardiac aITest resulting in severe brain damage. The House 
of Lords upheld the decision of the Judge and the Court of Appeal that the claim of 
35 I Kennedy & A Grubb Medical Law - Text with Materials (2ed, Butterworths & Co, London, 
1994) 468 . 
36 [1987] 2 All ER 909 (HL). 
37 [1988] I All ER 871. 
38 
[ 1997] 3 WLR 1151 (HL). 
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negligence failed for want of causation. As even if the doctor had attended, on the 
symptoms described the child would not have been intubated which was the only 
procedure that could have prevented the outcome. 
As the courts have refused to reverse the burden of proof causation remains a 
barrier to plaintiffs seeking to establish medical negligence. If the plaintiff suffered 
VTE and had increased risk factors or had asked questions about the risks involved 
it should be possible to establish medical misadventure. However if the plaintiff 
was in perfect health and did not make any inquiry as to the risks she might not be 
covered by accident compensation. 
2. Health and Disability Commissioner 's Code 
The plaintiff would need to establish that her doctor had failed to provide her with 
the information that a reasonable consumer in the plaintiff's circumstances would 
expect to receive. This would be the same as establishing a duty of care in 
negligence. Thus if the plaintiff had increased risk factors then her circumstances 
would demand a full explanation of the risks involved. If the plaintiff was a healthy 
woman the defendant would argue that a reasonable consumer would not expect 
disclosure of the risk. 
If the plaintiff established a breach of the Code then the Director of Proceedings 
may institute proceedings before the Complaints Review Tribunal. The benefit of 
an action for breach of the Health and Disability Commissioner' s Code is that not 
only can the plaintiff recover pecuniary damages and damages for loss of a benefit 
but also for any action of the defendant that was in flagrant disregard of the rights 
of the aggrieved person. An action of this kind does not require personal injury so 
is available in situations not covered by the Accident Compensation legislation. 
Thus it is possible to get both compensatory and exemplary damages in this action , 
however it is at the discretion of the Health and Disability Commissioner. 
13 
3. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
It may be possible to bring an action for a breach of section 11 of the Bill of Rights. 
However as it is a discretionary remedy the outcome would be uncertain where 
personal injury is involved. 
4. Exemplary Damages 
Exemplary damages may be recoverable under the Health and Disability 
Commissioner's Code or where the compensatory damages are insufficient to 
punish the defendant. Section 57 of the Health and Disability Commissioner's Act 
allows damages to be awarded against the defendant for a breach of the Code 
where the defendant's action was in flagrant disregard of the rights of the aggrieved 
person. The Code gives all consumers the right to the information that a reasonable 
consumer would expect to receive. The plaintiff would need to establish that a 
reasonable consumer would expect to be informed of the risks of using third 
generation oral contraceptive pills. Further the plaintiff would need to establish that 
the defendant's failure to adequately disclose the risks was a flagrant disregard of 
her rights. 
4. LEGAL POSITION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A. English legal position 
In England the law of consent has been developed by the courts rather than 
Parliament. So the rules have emerged in the context of specific disputes instead of 
being drafted to deal with general disputes. The English Courts have established 
one standard of medical negligence for all aspects of medical conduct - treatment, 
diagnosis and disclosure of risks . 
The most important English case on the standard of professional liability is Bolam 
v Friern Hospital Management Committee39 . In that case Bolam was a voluntary 
patient being treated for depression by electro-convulsive treatment (ECT) at Friern 
Hospital. During the ECT he sustained fractures of the pelvis on each side caused 
by the head of the femur being driven through the acetabulum or cup of the pelvis. 
Bolam alleged the defendants were negligent for failing to administer relaxant 
drugs or sufficient manual controls to prevent the fractures and failing to warn him 
of the risks he was running when he consented to the treatment. 
McNair J set out the standard of care of negligent professionals: 
The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to 
have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill at the 
risk of being found negligent. It is a well-established Jaw that it is sufficient if 
he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that 
particular art. 40 
a doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art ... putting it the other way around, a doctor is not negligent, if he is 
acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of 
opinion which would take a contrary view." 
McNair J formulated a two step test to determine if there is a duty to warn: 
(1) "does good medical practice require that a warning should be given"? 
(2) "if a warning should be given, what difference would it have made?"41 
The jury found for the defendant, Friern Hospital, so a practitioner need only 
disclose risks that a responsible body of medical people would disclose. Where 
there is more than one accepted body of competent opinion it is open to the 
practitioner to follow either of them.42 The patient also needs to establish they 
would have followed an alternate course of conduct had the advice been given. 
39 [1957] I WLR 582. 
40 Bo/am, above n39, 586. 
41 Bo/am, above n39, 588. 
42 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1985] l All ER 635 . 
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The House of Lords modified the professional standard of negligence slightly in 
Sidaway v Governors of the Bethlehem Royal & Maudsley Hospital. 43 The case 
does not provide a particularly coherent statement of the law as each of the four 
speeches contain significantly different approaches. However all five Law Lords 
agreed that Mrs Sidaway could not recover because of the difficulties of proving 
what was actually said due to the death of the doctor concerned. 
The plaintiff suffered from recurrent neck, shoulder and arm pain. She was advised 
by a surgeon employed by the defendant to undergo an operation on her spinal 
cord. In the course of the operation the plaintiffs spinal cord was injured resulting 
in severe disability. The plaintiff alleged the surgeon was negligent in failing to 
disclose to her the one - two percent risk of damage to the spinal cord and nerve 
roots. 
The majority of the Law Lords agreed that a subjective test for disclosure would be 
untenable. They rejected the North American concept of informed consent and 
held that the Bolam professional medical standard would prevail so as not to place 
unwarranted restraints on medical practice and to keep the law simple. However 
they added a slight modification: in a case involving "a substantial risk of grave 
adverse consequences"44 
. . . the judge might in certain circumstances come to the conclusion that 
disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice 
on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to 
make it. 45 
Lord Bridge of Harwich also added obiter that if questioned specifically about the 
risks involved in a particular treatment the doctor is under an obligation to answer 
both truthfully and as fully as the questioner requires46 . However in Blyth v 
Bloomsbury Health Authority47 the Court of Appeal considered the decisions in 
43 
Sidaway, above nl3 . 
44 Sidaway, above nl3, 663 . 
45 Sidaway, above nl3, 663. 
46 Sidaway, above nl3, 661. 
47 [1993) 4 Med LR 151. 
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Sidaway and held that Lord Diplock and Lord Bridge did not lay down any rule of 
law to the effect that where questions are asked by the patient the doctor is obliged 
to give all information to the patient. In that case the plaintiff claimed she had 
asked her doctor about the side effects of her medication and he had failed to warn 
her of the risks. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision at first instance on the 
facts as it was found that the plaintiff had not requested the information. The Court 
held "the question of what a plaintiff should be told in answer to a general enquiry 
cannot be divorced from the Bolam test"48 even where a specific question has been 
asked. 
In Sidaway Lord Scarman dissented, refusing to apply the Bolam principle to cases 
involving the provision of advice or information. Of the Bolam test he said "The 
implications of this view of the law are disturbing. It leaves the determination of a 
legal duty to the judgment of doctors." He argued that the prudent patient test 
should be applied in English law . 
. . . the merit of the propositions enunciated in Canterbury v Spence is that, 
without excluding medical evidence, they set a standard and formulate a test of 
the doctor's duty, the effect of which is that the Court determines the scope of 
the duty and decides whether the doctor has acted in breach of his duty. This 
result is achieved, first, by emphasis on the patient's "right of self 
determination" and second, by the "prudent patient" test. If the doctor omits to 
warn where the risk is such that, in the Court's view, a prudent person in the 
patient's situation would have regarded it as significant, the doctor is liable.49 
The House of Lords affirmation of the Bolam test has been critcised p1imarily 
because the test allows the standard of care of medical professionals to be 
determined by medical opinion50. This is based on the paternalistic body of thought 
that 'doctor knows best". In opposition to this view it is believed that " ... what 
constitutes, in Jaw, reasonable medical practice is a matter for judicial 
determination to be informed by, but not delegated to, medical opinion."51 In Reihl 
48 Blyth, above n47. 
49 Sidaway, above nl3, 653 . 
50 J Keown "Burying Bolam: Informed Consent Down Under" (1994) 53(1) CLJ 16-19. 
51 Above n50, 16. 
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v Hughes52 Laskin CJC stated: 
To allow expert medical evidence to determine what risks are material and, 
hence, should be disclosed and, correlatively, what risks are not material is to 
hand over to the medical profession the entire question of the scope of the 
duty of disclosure, including the question whether there has been a breach of 
53 that duty. 
In Rogers v Whitaker54 it was stated: 
... even if a patient asks a direct question about the possible risks or 
complications, the making of that inquiry would logically be of little or no 
significance; medical opinion determines whether the risk should or should 
not be disclosed and the express desire of a particular patient for information 
or advice does not alter that opinion or the legal significance of that 
opinion.55 
The test does not require the practice to be accepted by the majority of the medical 
body so "[t]he courts would appear to view with equanimity the notion that a 
procedure may be both in and not in a patient's best interests; medical opinion can, 
it seems, even defy logic."56 
Sidaway has been criticised for failing to produce a clear ratio descendi or 
statement of law as the four Law Lords took significantly different approaches in 
their judgments. Apart from Lord Scarman's dissent the Law Lords do not deal 
with the fundamental human right to control one's destiny by having sufficient 
information to make an informed choice whether to accept or refuse treatment57 . A 
further criticism is the failure to explore why doctors should be in a special position 
compared to other professionals. A solicitor would not be protected from liability if 
he or she took an action without their client's permission in order to save the client 
from the distress of making the decision.58 
52 (1980) 114 DLR (3d) l. 
53 Reihl v Hughes, above n52, 13. 
54 [1992] 175 CLR479. 
55 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54, 486-487. 
56 Above n50, 17. 
57 Health Care Law at 353 referring to I Kennedy Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics (1988, Clarendon, Oxford) at 389. 
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The test in Bolam also places a heavy burden on the plaintiff both in establishing a 
breach of the duty and causation. However two recent decisions of the High Court 
suggest that the courts may be easing these burdens59 . In Smith v Tunbridge Wells 
Health Authority60 the plaintiff, a 28 year old man, became impotent and lost 
bladder control after surgery to correct a rectal prolapse. Morland J followed the 
Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker61 by a 'proper application' rather than a 
rejection of the Bolam test, holding that "although some surgeons may still not 
have been warning patients similar in situation to the plaintiff of the risk of 
impotence, that omission was neither reasonable nor responsible." 
Smith can claim to be one of the very rare cases in which a doctor has been held 
liable in negligence even though acting in accordance with a practice accepted 
by other competent colleagues.62 
In McAllister v Lewisham and North Southwark Health Authority & Others63 the 
removal of a vascular deformity in the plaintiff's brain left her leg weaker than 
before the operation and one of her arms was rendered totally useless. Rougier J 
held the surgeon was negligent for failing to make a fuller disclosure of the risks. 
The judge then went on to hypothesize as to what the plaintiff would have done had 
she known all the risks and held on the balance of probabilities that she would have 
declined the operation. 
These two cases suggest a trend towards a less strict application of the Bolam 
principle. However until it is tested in the appellate courts the correct application of 
Bolam is unclear. 
B. Canadian Legal Position 
North America has developed a doctrine of informed consent based on the 
autonomy of each individual patient and the 1ight of self-determination. The classic 
58 Health Care Law at 353 referring to I Kennedy Patients, Doctors and Human Rights 
59 J Keown "Easing the Burdens on Medical Plaintiffs" (1995) 54(1) CLJ 30. 
60 [1994] 5 Med LR 334 (QB). 
61 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54. 
62 J Keown "Easing the Burdens on Medical Plaintiffs" (1995) 54(1) CLJ 30, 31. 
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statement of this comes from the 1914 American case Schleondorff v Society of 
New York Hospital: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
64 damages. 
Canadian doctors have a duty to their patients to disclose " ... the nature of a 
proposed operation, it's gravity, any material risks and any special or unusual risks 
attendant upon the performance of the operation."65 
The leading Canadian case is Reihl v Hughes66 which follows the American case of 
Canterbury v Spence67 in which it was held that doctors are obliged "to 
communicate specific information to the patient when the exigencies of due care 
call for it."68 "The scope of the physician's communications to the patient, then 
must measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information material to 
the decision."69 "A risk is ... material when a reasonable person, in what the 
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to 
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether to forego the 
proposed therapy."7° Causation will be shown if the plaintiff can establish s/he 
would have declined the treatment ifs/he had known of the risks.71 
Reihl v Hughes involved a neurosurgeon who failed to give adequate information 
to the plaintiff of the risks involved in an operation to repair an artery in the 
plaintiff's neck, the purpose of which was to prevent a stroke in the future. The 
surgeon advised that it was preferable to have the operation but neglected to inform 
that there was a ten percent risk that a stroke could occur during or immediately 
63 [1994] 5 Med LR 343 . 
64 (1914) 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92, 93. 
65 Hopp v Lepp (1980) 13 CCLT 66, 87 . 
66 Reihl v Hughes, above n52. 
67 ( 1972) F(2d) 772, 780, 791. 
68 Canterbury v Spence, above n67 , 781 . 
69 Canterbury v Spence, above n67 , 786. 
7° Canterbury v Spence, above n67 , 787 referring to Waltz and Scheuneman "Informed Consent to 
Therapy" (1970) 64 NWUL Rev 628, 639-41. 
71 Canterbury v Spence, above n67 , 79 l. 
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after the operation. The risk eventuated paralyzing the plaintiff down the right side 
of his body. 
Laskin CJC held that Jack of 'informed consent' cases should properly by handled 
under the law of negligence. Battery law applies only where there has been no 
consent, or the treatment goes beyond the consent, or the consent was obtained by 
fraud or misrepresentation.72 A doctor has a duty to disclose all material risks 
inherent in the proposed treatment because a patient has the "right to know what 
risks are involved in undergoing or foregoing certain surgery or other treatment."73 
Materiality of risks is "a matter for the trier of fact"74 and medical evidence will be 
relevant to findings as to the risks but will not be the sole consideration. It is a 
question of balancing the likelihood of the risk eventuating with the seriousness of 
the outcome. Madame Justice McLachlin stated: 
a medical person must disclose those risks to which a reasonable patient would 
be likely to attach significance in deciding whether or not to undergo the 
proposed treatment. In making this determination, the degree of probability of 
the risk and its seriousness are relevant factors. Thus an 'unusual' or 
improbable risk should be disclosed if its effects are serious. Conversely, a 
minor result should be disclosed if it is inherent in or a probable result of the 
process. 75 
The duty to disclose risks does have a qualification: 
... it may be the case that a particular patient, may because of emotional factors, 
be unable to cope with facts relevant to recommended surgery or treatment and 
the doctor may, in such a case be justified in withholding or generalising 
information as to which he would otherwise be required to be more specific.76 
On the issue of causation Laskin CJC preferred "to consider objectively how far the 
balance in the risks of surgery or no surgery is in favour of undergoing surgery."77 
If a reasonable person in the patient's particular position, would still have agreed to 
72 Reihl v Hughes, above n52, 13-14. 
73 Reihl v Hughes, above n52, 13. 
74 Reihl v Hughes, above n52 , 13. 
75 Rawlings v Lindsay (1982) 20 CCLT 301,306. 
76 Reihl v Hughes, above n52, 13. 
77 Reihl v Hughes, above n52, 16. 
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the treatment, even if all the material risks were disclosed, the failure to inform the 
patient fully cannot be said to be the cause of the patient's loss. 
In a recent case78 the Supreme Court of Canada refused to believe that the plaintiff 
would have followed an alternate course had she been fully informed of the risks. 
The physician failed to warn the plaintiff that her foetus might be injured as a result 
of the chickenpox she contracted during her pregnancy. She claimed she would 
have taken steps to terminate the pregnancy however the Supreme Court 
disbelieved her on the grounds she badly wanted a child. 
C. Australian Legal Position 
In 1983 the Supreme Court of Australia in F v R79 declined to apply Bolam and 
instead followed the Canadian reasoning in Reihl v Hughes . It was held that the 
duty to disclose risks existed and the determination of that duty was for a court of 
law not a professional body. 80 
The leading Australian case on disclosure of information is Rogers v Whitaker81. 
The plaintiff had been almost totally blind in her right eye since a childhood 
accident. The defendant, an opthalmic surgeon, recommended an operation on her 
right eye to remove scar tissue which would improve it'~ appearance and probably 
restore significant sight to the eye. Although the plaintiff made clear her great 
concern that no injury should befall her one good eye the surgeon failed to warn her 
of a one in 14 OOO risk of sympathetic opthalmalia. The surgical procedure did not 
restore any sight to her right eye and sympathetic opthalmalia left her totally blind 
in her left eye. 
The High Court of Australia, preferring Lord Scarman's dissent, held that the 
Bolam principle was inappropriate. 
While evidence of acceptable medical practice is a useful guide for the courts, it 
is for the courts to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of care after 
78 Arndt v Smith (1997) 148 DLR (4 th) 48. 
79 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189. 
so F v R, above n79, 191-194. 
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giving weight to 'the paramount consideration that a person is entitled to make 
his own decisions about his life82 
The Court held that the duty of a medical practitioner to exercise reasonable skill 
and care is a single comprehensive duty. 83 The standard of care to be observed by a 
person with some special skill or competence is that of the ordinary skilled person 
exercising and professing to have that special skill. 84 
The determjnation of a breach of the standard of care depends on the type of case. 
If the case involves diagnosis or treatment the standard of care is measured by the 
practice of a responsible body of medical opinion. If it is a case of the provision of 
information or advice it will be determined by the materiality of the risks involved. 
The law should recognise that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a 
material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the 
circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient ' s 
position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if 
the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk would be likely to attach significance to it. This 
duty is subject to the therapeutic privilege.85 
The therapeutic privilege is "an exception to the requirement that a medical 
practitioner divulge information on material risks viz where doing so would cause 
great harm to the patient."86 Thus a doctor must disclose risks of which a prudent 
patient would take account, but may refrain from disclosing when that might put 
the patient's health at great risk. 
To establish causation the plaintiff must prove he or she would not have consented 
to the treatment had the proper disclosure been made to him or her. Since Rogers v 
Whitaker87 there appears to be a trend towards viewing sceptically a patient's 
81 Rogers v Whittaker, above n54. 
82 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54 487 referring to F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 193. 
83 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54, 489. 
84 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54, 487. 
85 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54, 490. 
86 J Devereux Medical Law - Text, Cases & Materials (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, NSW, 1997) 138. 
87 Rogers v Whitaker, above n54. 
23 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
statement, that had he or she known of the risk, he or she would not have consented 
to the treatment. 88 In Berger v Mutton89 Twigg DCJ found the plaintiff was aware 
of the risks though she claimed she was not warned. Further his Honour held she 
would have had the operation even if the defendant had given a more detailed 
explanation of the risks. 
In Petrunic v Barnes9° Justice Tagdell held that even if the plaintiffs had known of 
the slight risk of failure of the tuba) ligation they would not have been dissuaded 
from the operation. In discussion of this case John Molnar stated " ... the case may 
be read to suggest that the Courts will look closely at the patient's alternatives if 
they are to argue that they would not have proceeded to surgery had they been 
adequately advised."91 
5. CASE STUDY: DISCLOSURE OF THE RISKS OF THIRD GENERATION 
ORAL CONTRACEPTIVE PILLS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND 
ENGLAND 
In Australia and Canada, like New Zealand, the plaintiff needs to establish a duty 
of care to disclose material risks. New Zealand' s test is based on the Australian 
reasonable patient test whilst the Canadian test looks to the balancing of the size of 
the risk with the outcome if the risk eventuates. In both cases a duty would be 
established where the plaintiff had increased risk factors of VTE or where she 
inquired about the risks involved. In the case of a healthy patient the Australian 
standard may fail to establish a duty however the Canadian standard may still found 
a duty as it is an unusual or improbable risk but the outcome, if it eventuates , is 
serious. 
The plaintiff, in both Australia and Canada, then has an evidential burden to 
establish that the doctor did not warn of the risk and that she suffered damage. 
88 J Devereux Medical law - Text, Cases & Materials (Cavendish Publi shing Ltd, NSW, 1997) 138. 
89 Berger v Mutton (22 November 1994) unreported, District Court, NSW 3584/ 1990, Twigg DCJ. 
90 [1989] VR 927. 
91 J Molnar "Consent in the 90 's" (1997) 16 Med Law 567, 575 . 
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In Australia the test for causation is subjective, so the plaintiff must establish she 
would have foregone the treatment if the risks had been adequately disclosed. 
While in Canada the test is objective so the plaintiff must establish that a 
reasonable person in her circumstances would have foregone the treatment. Thus 
the plaintiff would have a similar likelihood of establishing negligence in New 
Zealand as she would in Australia or Canada. 
However in England, to establish negligence, the plaintiff would need to show that 
the defendant failed to disclose the risk associated with the treatment and that this 
was not a practice accepted as proper by any responsible medical body. If the 
defendant is able to prove that there is a body of medical opinion which would not 
disclose the risk then there may be no duty upon the doctor to disclose the risk. 
However Smith v Tunbridge92 may allow a Judge to find for the patient on the basis 
that although some doctors still were not warning their patients of the risk, that 
omission was neither reasonable nor responsible. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The development of the law in New Zealand has been dominated by statutes due to 
the accident compensation legislation. Whereas in Australia, Canada and England 
the courts have shaped the Jaw. However this does not appear to have hindered its 
progress. 
The duty to advise and inform patients of the risks and implications of proposed 
treatment exists in all four jurisdictions examined but the standards of medical 
negligence differ. A plaintiff, inadequately informed of the risks of third generation 
oral contraceptive pills, who develops VTE has a strong case for compensation in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Dogged by the Bolam principle, England lags 
behind, still leaving the medical profession to determine their own standards. 
Despite the existence of a duty of care medical negligence remains difficult to 
establish due to the hurdle of causation . Plaintiffs have the onerous task of 
92 Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 334. 
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establishing the medical cause and that the doctor's conduct was the cause of the 
medical outcome. Yet courts have been reluctant to reverse the burden of proof. 
The law in New Zealand recognises that patients must be treated as intelligent, 
mature and rational individuals who require information so as they can make 
informed choices about their treatment. This may require physicians to spend more 
time explaining concepts to patients, which could be time consuming and costly, 
though not as costly as litigation. However communication should improve the 
doctor - patient relationship and if communications improve then lawsuits should 
decline. 
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